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CONTRACTS RESTRICTING THE USE OFIDEAS
1. Would the ultimate contractual power be the ability to control 
ideas by contract? Of all the things in which to have contractual 
rights, would ideas be the most valuable?
The purpose of this article is to shed somé light on certain con­
tract practices in the United States that have developed as récéntly 
as during the last 20 years, wherein contracting parties attempt to 
agree upon the restriction of ideas, perhaps in excess of what the 
intellectual property laws or interests of society may allow.
Two topics in this area are addressed. The first is the prevalent 
attempted use of trade secret law in contracts, far overreaching rea- 
sonable limitations. The second area involves contracting parties’ 
efforts to control competitive use of those ideas which may be 
demonstrated in software.
Trade secret law in the United States allows fór a juridical person 
to legally protect from disclosure, or collect damages fór the disclo- 
sure of, information which the person has maintained in secrecy. 
Physical and informational barriers must have been established and 
maintained in order fór information to qualify as a trade secret and 
to be qualified fór the benefit of legal protection. Fór example, 
information needs to have been closely held within a company and 
nőt disclosed to others without their agreement to maintain the 
secret. If the information has been disclosed to others without such 
agreement, it no longer qualifies as a trade secret. Therefore, if it is 
necessary fór the person or firm to share the information with 
another party in order to achieve the firm’s business objectives, the 
discloser and recipient contract, with the recipient engaging in a 
contractual promise nőt to release the information to others. These 
contracts, often referred to as “non-disclosure agreements,” “confí- 
dential disclosure agreements,” or “proprietary information agree­
ments” should identify in somé way the natúré of the secrets to be
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disclosed. Freedom of contract allows for a variety of provisions in 
these contracts, and disclosers often include a provision limiting the 
usés to which the recipient can pút the information, operating 
almost as a limited license for its use. Most often these “purpose” 
provisions provide that the only purpose for which recipient can 
use the information is in furtherance of the business collaboration 
between the parties, for the benefit of the discloser.
Such contracts prohibiting disclosure can be employed to pre- 
yent the publication or communication of the data of the disclosure. 
A good example would be the prevention of the disclosure of a com- 
pany’s customer mailing list or wage information regarding each of 
the company’s employees. Clearly the company would share that 
information only with a trusted supplier who would nőt leak the 
information to others, and this is a traditional and understandable 
use of such a contract.
It seems logical that a discloser would include a provision in the 
contract that the recipient could nőt utilized the information in fur- 
therance of the recipient’s own business.
In the current evolution of this form of contract in the United 
States, the contracting party playing the role of “discloser” is chang- 
ing the clauses identifying the “secrets” to be disclosed. Now we 
observe and encounter provisions entirely vague as to the informa­
tion to be disclosed. Take, for example, a contract proposed to 
cover the content of a meeting between two parties. The “informa­
tion” to be disclosed is then described as “any and all information, 
whether written or órai, disclosed to Recipient.” Suppose, in fur­
therance of this example, that the Discloser will describe his method 
of manufacturing goods or the design of a new product. This “infor­
mation,” disclosed orally, in fact may well comprise ideas them- 
selves, perhaps devoid of data.
Recipient, if he has signed the contract, is now forbidden from 
disclosing any such idea to others. Alsó, if the contract contains the 
standard clause providing that Recipient cannot use what is dis­
closed for any purpose other than his collaboration with the 
Discloser, Recipient is now under a contractual obligation to forego 
the use of an entire idea.
These contracts have become pervasive in commercial practice.
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A normál firm will be asked to sign many such forms every year. In 
fact, in many places of business, persons wishing to be admitted to 
the physical facilities will be “required” to sign, on behalf of his own 
firm and himself, such a form contract. The contractual effect is that 
the visitor has agreed to quash, fór his own use or even fór his own 
discussion with others, all ideas which may be discussed or in evi- 
dence within that facility. Signing such a contract, prior to admis- 
sion to a facility or meeting, when in ignorance of the ideas which 
may be proposed, opens the possibility that ideas which are other- 
wise available in society are quashed by contract. The ubiquitous 
natúré of these contracts in commerce today in the United States 
leads to the probable consequence that ideas nőt otherwise legiti- 
mately protected by other forms of intellectual property are 
removed from open circulation in commerce and society through 
the operation of contracts.
Traditional trade secret law provides limited defenses against 
accusations of breach of such a contract. If the defendant can prove 
that the idea was available to him prior to that time from another 
source, this may provide a defense. The problem then becomes one 
of proof. Ideas that could never attain the protection of patent law, 
fór example due to lack of novelty or due to obviousness, still may 
nőt be presentable from other sources in a form sufficient to pro­
vide proof. Obviousness of the idea does nőt provide a defense to 
the allegation of breach of contract.
The implied intent of such overreaching non-disclosure con­
tracts is clearly to quell competition. Upon the success o f a new 
product, competitors can search their files in order to ascertain 
whether the successfui company has ever entered intő one such 
vague non-disclosure agreement with them. Then the competitor 
can allege that the idea was at one time orally disclosed under the 
contract and that the contract has been breached.
One may ask, “Could nőt the defendant in this situation simply 
prove that the idea was nőt in fact disclosed to them?” In cases 
wheré this evidence is provable, the defense has value. However, as 
noted above, the contracts in practice today regularly provide fór no 
identifícation of the subject matter at the time of the agreement and
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provide that the obligation attains even in the absence of any objec- 
tive proof or written evidence.
This web of contractual entanglements between firms is intend- 
ed to subdue competition. The vague and overreaching obligations 
create an uncertain threat upon the introduction of new products 
and Services. Firms must check their numerous non-disclosure and 
non-use contracts in an attempt to ascertain their freedom to intro- 
duce new products and Services. The net social benefit of this con­
tractual expansion of trade secret intellectual property law is called 
intő question.
Traditional forms o f intellectual property law are nőt effectively 
providing boundaries on this expansion. In the United States, nei- 
ther patent nor copyright law impairs the spread of restrictions on 
the use of ideas through the power of this freedom to contract.
So freedom to contract has wrought a restriction on the free use 
of ideas.
2. In the area of contracting fór software programs, the relation- 
ship of contract law to intellectual property law has received more 
judicial attention, although the overall State o f the law at this time is 
nőt clear.
Software providers originally used contracts to govern the use of 
their products in the U.S., because Congress and the courts were 
nőt sure that software was a proper subject of copyright law.1 The 
value of software is in its utility and its object code function rather 
than a particular work’s nonfunctional expressive elements, so 
copyright seemed questionable as the properly applicable law. The 
software industry sought contract protection fór their programs.2 
Software authors utilized contracts privately to specify what rights 
were granted or transferred, and which were excluded, using their 
own definitions. They described the products they offered, and 
controlled their liability. „Bargained agreements" were used fór 
software developed specifically fór a user; „unbargained shrinkwrap 
agreements1* were utilized fór mass markét distribution of software.3 
The National Commission on New Technological Uses of 
Copyrighted Works recommended software copyrightability to the 
Congress, and in addressing the problem fór the first time, the copy­
rightability of software became law in the 1976 Copyright Act.4
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Protection of software as a copyrightod-literary work by the,,courts 
then occurred.5 Copyright law is now computer software^ primary 
source of legal protection in the United , States, and unbargained 
shrinkwrap licenses.on mass markét software are prevalent.6 J(1
Copyright law, however, is rich with a history spanning hundr 
reds of years when software did nőt exist. The U.S. Constitution 
provides that the purpose of copyright law is „to prompté the 
progress o f Science and the useful arts.“7 Section 102(B) of the 
Copyright Act States, „in no case does copyright protection fór an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operádon, concept, principle or discovery 
régardless of the form in which it is described, illustrated or embo- 
died in such work.“8
The United States Supreme Court noted in Sony Corp. o f 
America v. Universal Stúdiós, Inc., that copyright law seeks to 
achieve a balance between „the interest of authors...in the control 
and exploitation of their writings...on the one hand, and society’s 
competing interest in the free flow of ideas...on the other."9 An 
important part of the balance is permitting or encouraging the pub- 
lic to сору unoriginal matériái. When courts were dealing with ordi- 
nary text writings, they attempted to strike this balance by distin- 
guishing between ideas and expression. Ideas remained in the pub- 
lic domain. Courts recognized that if an idea could be protected, 
intellectual progress would be slowed. Requiring payment fór a cer- 
tain author’s expression of the idea still leit opportunity fór others 
to express the idea in their own Creative ways.
Courts then faced this same policy issue after 1976, with regard 
to software programs. Courts promptly diverged in this analysis, 
with a confusing set of tests to be applied to software, including 
„the abstractions test,“ the „successive filtering method" and even 
implementing (and then reversing) the „look and feel“ test. It is nőt 
the purpose of this discussion to analyze these confusing attempts 
to define copyright coverage of software. The point here is that soft­
ware vendors were (and still are) uncertain what is protected. 
Software licensors are retuming to contract law to secure greater 
rights than those afforded by copyright law.
One important area in this regard is the subject of reverse engi-
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ímpórtánt limitation ön itheir rights as copyright hólders.10
' "A  software programmér-writes his program' in humán readable 
„source code.“ A compiler program translates the source code intő 
objéct code, which is only machine-readable. Gommercial programs 
áré then distributed in object code only. Therefore, the uncopy- 
rightable elements and ideas are only available through the deriva- 
tiö n o f the software’s hu mari readable source code through „decom- 
pilation" and „disassembly11 reverse engineering processes.11 Evén 
though intermediate copies or translations are made in this process, 
United States courts have uniformly held that decompilation and 
disassembly are permitted under copyright law if they are under- 
taken fór the purpose of obtaining specifications needed to make 
interoperable or competitive products, and if this is the only means 
to access the uncopyrightable elements.12 Thus copyright, balánced 
with a reasonable scope of fair use, protects the „fair use“ of ascer- 
taining the ideas behind the expression to allow the creation of 
compatible and competitive products.
As a response to this Fair Use Doctrine allowing reverse engi­
neering under copyright law, firms attempt to prohibit reverse engi­
neering of their software by employing contractual devices which 
include prohibitions against reverse engineering in most off-the- 
shelf open markét software shrinkwrap licenses. (Beneath a clear 
outer wrapping is a visible license agreement, which States that by 
removing the plastic shrinkwrap enclosing the software, the end 
user agrees to the terms of the license.13) This license almost always 
includes a prohibition on reverse engineering.14
The U.S. Supreme Court found these shrinkwrap agreements to 
be generally enforceable.15 However, the debate regarding a 
shrinkwrap license prohibiting reverse engineering has created ten- 
sion between State contract law and copyright law.16 In the case of 
Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, the U.S. Court of Appeals fór the 
Federal Circuit upheld the conclusion that a shrinkwrap license can 
bar reverse engineering of a software program, adopting a blanket 
rule that such restrictions should never be preempted by the 
Federal Intellectual Property Laws.17
IP Laws grant certain exclusive rights or monopoly privileges to
D á v id  G . H u g l é y  _
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authors, bút the privileges are ultimately associated with public 
interests. Courts and legislatures saw the need to limit the scope of 
the IP monopoly. Copyright „fair use“ doctrine reflects this need fór 
limitations on copyrights. The Fair Use Doctrine exempts a reverse 
engineer froiri liability fór certain decompilation that would other- 
wise infringe in an attempt to limit a copyright holder’s exclusive 
right in order nőt to stifle Creative efforts by competitors through 
exploring information committed to the public domain through 
copyright. Effective competition requires software developed by 
competitors to be compatible with existing standard systems. So 
reverse engineering should be allowed in order to accomplish com- 
patibility. In the case of Eichel v. Marsan, the Court held that: if an 
author, by originating a new arrangement and form of expression of 
certain ideas or conceptions, could withdraw these ideas or concep- 
tions from the stock of materials to be used by other authors, each 
copyright would narrow the field of thought open fór development 
and exploitation in Science, poetry, narrative and dramatic fiction, 
and other branches of literature would be hindered by copyright 
instead of being promoted.18
Justice Brandeis said that „the noblest of humán productions- 
knowledge, truths ascertaíned, conceptions and ideas -  become, 
after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common 
use.“19 In terms of economic efficiency, ideas or concepts, because 
they are basic building blocks of creation, should be free fór use. If 
decompilation is nőt allowed, this results in a de facto monopoly by 
the owner o f the copyright over the functional aspects of the works.
The Copyright Act was intended to promote growth and Creative 
expression based on the dissemination of other Creative works and 
the unprotected ideas contained in those works.20 The ultimate aim 
of the Copyright Act is to benefit the public through the distribution 
of knowledge, rather than to reward individual authors.21 Evén 
though copyright law grants an author certain exclusive rights, the 
author should nőt use these rights to maintain its dominance and 
control in a manner adverse to public policy.
Uncertainty of freedom to contract in this area is serious. A
shrinkwrap license can impose very restrictive terms, or a prohibi-
IG
119
D á v id  G . H u g l e y
tion on reverse engineering, eliminating the right to create a com- 
patible or competitive product.
Restrictions on software reverse engineering through anticom- 
petitive conduct or copyright license agreements may constitute 
copyright misuse or a violation of antitrust laws. The Copyright 
Misuse Doctrine was first established in the case of Lasercomb 
Am erica, Inc., v. Reynolds, which expressly upheld the defense 
against an infringement action.22 Lasercomb, the copyright owner, 
included in its license agreement contractual provisions, which pre- 
cluded licensees front developing competitive software fór a period 
of 99 years.23 The Court held that the underlying restrictive license 
agreement went further than protecting against copying and was 
used in a manner adverse to the public policy embodied in a copy­
right grant.24
Copyright misuse is a defense against an allegation of copyright 
infringement. Conduct underlying a copyright misuse defense in an 
infringement case may serve as a basis fór antitrust liability. 
However, an antitrust claim requires proof of additional elements: 
markét power, competitive injury, anticompetitive intent, etc. 
However, proof o f an antitrust violation can often serve to establish 
copyright misuse.25 An antitrust claim gives rise to damages, where- 
as copyright misuse is an absolute defense against a claim of copy­
right infringement.
In somé cases, a contract prohibiting software reverse engineer­
ing is subject to copyright misuse or antitrust liability. In the case 
of Alcatel U.S.A, Inc., v. DGI Technologies, Inc., the United States 
Court o f Appeals fór the Fifth Circuit ruled that a license agreement 
prohibiting reverse engineering constituted copyright misuse.26 If a 
license, in order to extend copyright protection beyond its proper 
scope, prevents competitors from detecting or understanding 
unprotected ideas or functional elements embodied in a computer 
program and from developing competing or interoperable prod- 
ucts, it constitutes anticompetitive use of the copyright. This find- 
ing requires alsó a finding that federal copyright law preempts State 
contract law. Alternatively, the State court could find that the term 
in shrinkwrap license is unconscionable in this contract of adhe- 
sion. The 50 States vary in their contract law as to the enforceabili-
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ty of all terms of shrinkwrap license. The „Uniform Computer 
Information Transaction Act“ is proposed model legislation fór the 
States in the law of software contracting, bút has only been adopted 
by two States: Maryland and Virginia. It provides fór enforceability 
of all terms of a shrinkwrap license including prohibition of reverse 
engineering and restrictions on interoperability.
A shrinkwrap contract in a mass markét application program is 
nőt negotiated and is a standard form contract. As such, it may be 
unenforceable under the contract doctrine of unconscionability. 
Courts could choose nőt to enforce certain terms. The contract is at ' '
subject of State law. State common and statutory laws have often 
clashed with federal laws regarding patents and copyrights. A State 
law rule or contract term may be invalidated by federal preemption. 
A contract term that varies the effect of a federal law that cannot be 
varied by agreement under the Copyright Act may be unenforceable. 
Therefore, an antireverse engineering provision under a licensing 
contract may be unenforceable if it denies federally created fair use. 
Section 301 (A) of the Copyright Act is intended to preempt com­
mon law or statutes of any State which are equivalent to the exclu- 
sive federal copyright. A contractual restriction on reverse engineer­
ing expressly narrows the scope of fair use rights, which places an 
arbitrary power in the hands of the copyright holder going far 
beyond the protection provided by law.27 In Symantec Corp. v. 
McAfee Associates, Inc., the Court held that a software license pro- 
hibiting reverse engineering was preempted by Section 301 of the 
Copyright Act.
In Vauit Corp. v. Quaid Software, Limited, the United States 
Court of Appeals fór the Fifth Circuit used the Supremacy Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution to set aside a contractual prohibition upon 
reverse engineering, noting that the prohibition „conflicts with the 
rights of computer program owners under Section 117“ of the 
Copyright Act and „touches upon an area of federal copyright 
law.“28
Contract terms prohibiting reverse engineering may be unen­
forceable because they are unconscionable. As explained in the offi- 
cial comments to the “Uniform Computer Information Transaction 
Act” (the model act mentioned earlier), the basic test is whether, in
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light o f the generál commercial background and the commercial 
needs of the particular trade or case, the terms involved are so one- 
sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at 
the time the contract was mádé. The principle is one of prevention 
of oppression and unfair surprise and nőt of disturbance of alloca- 
tion of risks because o f superior bargaining power.
Procedúra! unconscionability particularly applies in the context 
of adhesion contracts, as it has been defined in the model act as “the 
lack of a meaningful choice, considering all the circumstances sur- 
rounding the transaction including the manner in which the cont­
ract was entered, and whether each party had a reasonable oppor- 
tunity to understand the terms of the contract, and whether the 
important terms were hidden. If a Court finds a contract or term 
thereof to be unconscionable, the Court may refuse to enforce the 
contract, enforce it without the unconscionable term, or limit the 
application o f the term in order to avoid an unconscionable result 
in order to prevent oppression and unfair surprise, and because of 
superior bargaining power.29 Basically, the question is whether the 
term involved is so one-sided and unfair as to be unconscionable. 
Alsó, a contract of adhesion is one to which one of the parties must 
adhere to the powers o f a monopolist on a take-it or leave-it basis. 
In Vauit Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., the Court found the 
shrinkwrap license to be unenforceable as a contract of adhesion.
The Bowers v. Baystate Technologies decision by the Court of 
Appeals fór the Federal Circuit is in conflict with other Federal 
Courts o f Appeals decisions. A shrinkwrap license attempting to 
bind the purchaser to the vendor’s terms offers only the choice of 
nőt buying the software. This self-proclaimed contract provides a 
copyright owner the superior power to override public law with a 
contract of adhesion.30
Software producers now go even further than prohibiting 
reverse engineering. They attempt to go so far as using the contract 
to prohibit the licensee from “attempting to determine the method 
of operádon” of the software; and alsó contain provisions prohibit­
ing the creation of competitive products and the creation of com- 
patible products without the licensor’s approval.
Please consider this example clause taken from the license fór a
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software product currently shipping in the United States, which 
States:
“NONCOMPETITION. Licensee agrees nőt to use the Program 
...to distribute its own or a Third Party’s Application, a principal pur- 
pose of which, as reasonably determined by [Licensor] is to perform 
the same or similar functions as Programs licensed by [Licensor] or 
which replaces any component of the Programs. Licensee shall nőt 
otherwise use the Programs to compete with the products or busi­
nesses of [Licensor] ...”
These provisions, as well as a prohibition on reverse engineer- 
ing, may be subject to antitrust scrutiny under 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Though no claim regarding an anti-reverse-engineering provision 
has been brought as of now, a number of potential antitrust issues 
arise. Section 1 forbids any contract in restraint o f trade. Anti- 
reverse engineering clauses restrain trade within the meaning of the 
statute since they limit the ability to develop comparable products, 
if the natúré of the restraint would be characterized as unreasonable 
under either “per se illegality” or the “rule of reason.” The “rule of 
reason” would most likely be applied, weighing a broad inquiry intő 
the natúré of the defendant’s intent and purpose, justifications fór - 
the restrictions, competitor’s competitive position, and the eífect of 
the challenged restrictions.
IN CONCLUSION,
The various legal doctrines analyzed above do nőt offer any clear 
guidance as to how the issue of the conflict between copyright law 
and contract law will be resolved. Nőne of these doctrines definé, 
within a predictable system, on the basis of what criteria contractu- 
al provisions will be held unenforceable despite the fact that they 
excessively restrict the users’ rights in the context of copyright law. 
Fór example, the copyright misuse doctrine could potentially be 
used to invalidate contractual provisions that are anticompetitive, 
bút little guidance currently exists as to its scope of application. 
The doctrines of public policy and unconscionability, considered as 
two generál doctrines of contract law, are nőt specific enough to
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deal with the issue. These doctrines could only be helpful if the 
courts adapted them to the specific characteristics of software 
licensing transactions. However, even though the doctrine of 
unconscionability is overbroad, this doctrine might be helpful in 
showing that a contract will be considered oppressive, and thus 
likely to be unconscionable, because it is offered on a take-it-or- 
leave-it basis.
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 
“Fundamental Public Policy Exception” provides that: “if a term of a 
contract violates a íundamental public policy, the court may refuse 
to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder of the contract with- 
out the impermissible term, or limit the application of the imper- 
missible term so as to avoid a result contrary to public policy, in 
each case to the extern that the interest in enforcement is clearly 
outweighed by a public policy against enforcement of the term.”
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act does nőt 
further define what is meant by fundamental public policy. The offi- 
cial commentary identifies three concepts which may qualify as fun­
damental public policy: innovation, competition, and freedom of 
expression (fair comment and fair use). It States:
“Innovation policy recognizes the need fór a balance between 
protecting property interests in information to encourage its cre- 
ation, and the importance of a rich public domain upon which most 
innovation ultimately depends. Competition policy prevents unrea- 
sonable restraints on publicly available information in order to pro- 
tect competition. . .. Free expression and the public interest in sup- 
porting public domain use of published information alsó underlie 
fair use as a restraint on information property rights.”
There is no clear public policy that prevents parties frorn con- 
tracting around the limitations of copyright law. The identification 
of innovation, competition and freedom of expression as the key 
values that are potentially threatened by excessively restrictive con- 
tracts should be particularly considered.
Indeed, these are the same fundamental policies that courts in 
the United States should creatively learn to apply to the unbridled 
use of overreaching non-disclosure agreements identified in Section 1.
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